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Abstract 
Evolution of consumers' preferences has been recognized by many scholars as 
being key to understanding technological change. However, mainstream economics 
cannot account for the seemingly irrational behavior of consumers based on changes in 
taste – consumer theory lacks exibility and accuracy to explain changes in consumer 
behavior. Adopting a behavioral psychology perspective, this paper argues that there is a 
rational pattern in the change of consumers' tastes. I argue that behavioral psychology 
offers us a unique perspective to solve some of the paradoxes of consumer behavior. This 
paper incorporates exibility into CES utility function to more adequately account for, and 
differentiate between, habit formation routines. A model is developed in which habit 
formation and consumption of new goods are interrelated. 
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1 Introduction
In this article want to study the effects of technical change from the final
demand aspect. This means that we need the consumer to consider new
products in her maximizing decisions and to understand the evolution of
preferences. How preferences change to allow the consumer to choose new
goods while retaining some old habits. That is the aim of this article - to
explore ideas that allow consumer theory to explain the choice and consump-
tion of new goods, and the cohabitation of such decisions with the formation
of habits.
Even though we acknowledge the importance of new consumption, it is
incorrect to base consumer theory purely on new products. If our goal is
to explain real behaviour, we must take into account that consumer deci-
sions are an interaction of new possibilities with previous purchasing habits.
When we follow the patterns of an individual’s consumption we see that
some goods are consumed several times. We also see that sometimes new
things are bought to try them out. After trial, some goods will become
habitually bought and others never again.
Consumer theory, as it appears in text books, is not a useful theory when
studying product innovation. It is a logical tool that only considers quanti-
ties and prices to explain a decision taken by an individual. Once the choice
is made we can explain how the decision will change if prices change. The
main problem arrives the second time the consumer must choose between
the same goods. We have to assume that the person’s preferences have not
changed between these two occasions and so, if prices are also constant, the
second decision must be exactly equal to the first one. This assumption is
too strong and blocks the analysis of product innovation. Despite this fact,
rather than negating the theory, we shall transform it to make it sufficiently
flexible for our purposes.
Therefore we consider it worth dedicating this article to understanding
and analysing preference evolution within the framework of technological
change. Here, there will be not a final point on the state of consumer theory,
but a first step toward some changes that need to be made to comprehend
the importance of technology in the world economy.
Having said that, the main point of the article is the evolution of pref-
erences - aiming to explain why old consumption patterns survive with new
products. If this is our aim, there are some questions that need to be an-
swered: Why and how do we develop consumption habits? Why do we
consume new products? And how can these two actions be integrated into
a single decision made by the consumer?
This article will not deal with the social dimension in consumer patterns
although we acknowledge its importance. It will focus on the behaviour of
an individual consumer. The work will be mainly looking at “inconspicuous”
consumption patterns.
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The article is organised as follows: in section 2 we review the literature
concerning consumer behaviour, in section 3 the three main topics of habit
formation, novelty and how to integrate both will be discussed, section 4
simplifies these ideas into a mathematical model and the last section, 5,
provides a conclusion.
2 The dynamics of utility in the economic litera-
ture
The purpose of this review of the literature is to analyse attempts to make
economic theory more responsive to consumer behaviour. We focus particu-
larly on understanding product innovation from the consumers’ perspective.
With this in mind, we shall first look at the origin of two main assump-
tions which are incompatible with innovations: fixed preferences and inter-
temporal independence. The next step will be to analyse attempts to see
how consumer behaviour is affected by either past or future consumption.
Afterwards we discuss some criticisms made of consumer theory and try to
locate our research in the literature.
The idea of fixed preferences follows from the theory of revealed pref-
erences. It was proposed by Samuelson (1938) and it is one of the most
restrictive ideas concerning consumer behaviour. He focused on the idea
that when a consumer chooses a set of goods at a constant set of prices, she
is revealing her preferences. Thus, assuming that her preferences are stable
over time he argues that indifference curves are not very relevant, that a lot
of information can be found from the consumer’s elections independently of
the existence of the utility curve. This information is more empirical and
inductive than that derived from indifference curves. His main concern was
the fact that utility can not be measured either in a cardinal or in an ordinal
way; however, the consumer reveals her preferences every time she chooses
something, and this is the information that economists should use. A deep
view into the main issues he was dealing with will bring us to a discussion
of whether utility can be measured. The impossibility of measurement is a
central point of his discussion.
The issue of measuring utility brings us to the origin of the concept of
utility, which goes back to Bentham and J.S. Mill. They introduced this con-
cept, with the certainty that utility could be measured in a scientific way,
as a result of processes of pleasures and pains. In their work they presented
lists of sources of human pain and satisfaction. They argued that pleasure or
pain could be measured depending on variables such as intensity, duration,
certainty or uncertainty and propinquity or remoteness. After compiling an
exhaustive list of human sources for pain and pleasure and the variables that
control the level of satisfaction, they aimed to assess the state of any individ-
3
ual. Their ideas were further discussed and worked out by the marginalists
(Jevons, Walras and Menger), crystallizing into one important concept: de-
creasing marginal utility. It means that when people enjoy things, the more
they have the better it is, but each extra unit of the same good adds slightly
less utility than the previous unit did. The concept was still based implic-
itly on measurability. Using this concept, Marshall (1890) deduced demand
curves, making a strong logical link with indifference curves. However, the
idea that utility could be measured was soon problematic. At the beginning
of the following century an influential economist, Robbins (1935), came to
the conclusion that utility could be only measured in an ordinal way. His
idea was more that, even though it was possible to order the preferences
of the consumer, it was not possible to assign a number to an experienced
pleasure. In a way he tries to move consumer theory from a theory based on
values to a general logical choice. Hicks and Allen (1934a,b), taking Robbins’
arguments, make a whole review of critical concepts derived from consumer
choice: marginal utility, elasticity of substitution, expenditure curves, de-
mand curves, complementarity... basically they conclude that these concepts
can be used even if we measure utility in an ordinal way. To end this issue
we refer to the work of a prestigious economist - and note how economic
theory evolves in a circular manner. Since, in more recent research, the
Nobel laureate Kahneman and his colleagues (1999) propose going back to
Bentham, arguing that science now allows us to measure utility with accu-
rate methods. In his work he suggested two ways of measuring utility: based
either on reports made by the consumer or in physiological measurements
(heart pressure, brain waves...). He suggests that in such a way we could
move toward a more experimental consumer theory.
Thus the notion that one can measure the hedonistic pleasure that any
good gives to an individual leads to the idea that utility can also be mea-
sured, whether in a cardinal (Bentham and Mills) or ordinal manner Robbins
(1935). Hicks and Allen (1934a,b) proved a demand curve can be derived
from either case. However demand curves relate price and quantity for one
single product. They are derived from indifference curves, which always re-
late a set of existing goods to levels of utility. The issue of the apparition of
a new good, and how it affects indifferences curves and demand, was never
discussed by these economists.
A second point, which is related to the stability of preferences, is the
inter-temporal independence assumption: preferences are affected by nei-
ther past nor future consumption. Under this assumption, what I consume
today is not affected by what I consumed yesterday nor by something I
will consume tomorrow. However this assumption is too unrealistic and too
strong. The consumer is always the same person over time and a connec-
tion between decisions taken at different moments is to be expected. To
illustrate the problems associated with the independence assumption, some
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words from Samuelson, the economist who stated the theory of revealed
preferences:
“ The amount of wine that I drank yesterday and will drink to-
morrow can be expected to have effects upon my today’s indifference
slope between wine and milk.” Samuelson (1952).
Some economists have tried to work on the relaxation of this idea. Two
groups will be now discussed: scholars who try to see how past experiences
affect present decisions and others who look to the relation between present
choices and future elections. In other words the utility is affected either by
past consumption or by future consumption. Starting with past consump-
tion affecting present decisions, the first attempt to break the assumption
of temporal consumption independence came from Duesenberry (1949). He
was trying to find more coherent and realistic ways to explain consumer
behaviour. In his book one idea is highlighted: consumption is used to cre-
ate a self image. Consumption patterns are explained by belonging to a
peer group; he was thus able to explain why consumption patterns were so
stable in the presence of a change in income. One idea that follows from
his work, and that is relevant for us, is that consumption is determined by
habits. Hence present decisions are a consequence of past experiences. He
proposed to look at past consumption and presented the idea of habit forma-
tion. Some years later Pollak (1970) presented a first formal study of habit
formation in consumer theory. He focused on linear utility functions and the
implications of introducing habit formation into the consumer maximizing
behaviour. He concluded that consumer theory is more responsive if past
consumption is allowed to interfere with present decisions. His contribution
was further worked by Ryder and Heal (1973). They looked at how habit
formation affects the optimal path of a neoclassical growth model. However,
the literature concerning growth and habit formation will be presented in
the next chapter. Therefore we return to contributions at the level of micro
consumer theory.
The next point to consider is how future consumption affects present
utility. The idea is not new, its roots going back to Jevons. The logic is
the following: if somebody invites me to go to the cinema tomorrow, my
utility is increased from the moment I am invited. However, future utility
needs to be discounted to bring it to the present moment. In general this is
done by using exponential functions. Ainslie (1975, 1991, 1992) has written
strenuously against this method of discounting future utilities. Instead he
gives founded reasons for using a hyperbolic discounted function. To un-
derstand the importance of the matter it is worth looking at the argument
made by Thaler (1981): asked to choose, a person might prefer to have one
apple today than two tomorrow while at the same time preferring to have
two apples within 51 days than one in 50 days. Most consumers will chose
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one apple today and two in fifty-one days. The hyperbolic function, being
more concave than the exponential function, solves the problem. Despite
the agreement on using a hyperbolic function when discounting, the value
of the discount factor seems to depend very much on the empirical exper-
iment. For a review of matters concerning discounting see Frederick et al.
(2002).
As soon as future decisions become part of preference formation we have
to take uncertainty into account. A general finding among economists and
psychologists working with uncertainty decisions is the so-called loss-gain
asymmetry. When the consumer is asked about the effect of a future gain
she always overestimates its real utility, and when is questioned about a
possible loss she underestimates it. For a group of researchers this is cru-
cial, and it was first suggested by Markowitz (1952) that consumer theory
should be based on gain and loss prospects instead of being based on choices
of quantities depending on prices. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) incorpo-
rated this idea and they present a model of consumer decision-making under
uncertainty. Their contribution solves Allais’ paradox; decisions under un-
certainty are not related to expected probability. They concluded that it is
not the real probability that makes the consumer decide but the perceived
uncertainty. When the consumer is discounting future outcomes the general
conclusion is that losses are discounted at a lower rate than future gains.
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) found that the ratio in which most con-
sumers discount losses versus gains is almost constant, approximately one
to two. They also point out that the key variable to look at is not general
loss-gain but the relative gain. The consumer’s initial situation determines
her behaviour and the way she values things. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992)
introduced a model that takes into account these irregularities. They work
with a value based on deviation from an anticipated reference consumption.
This function has different curvatures depending on whether the consumer
is evaluating a positive or negative gain. With their work they are able to
discuss the effect of the consumer’s psychology on the economy. For exam-
ple, they argue that the uncertainty the consumer faces about the future
will reinforce business cycles. Another interesting conclusion is of the in-
capacity of the consumer to predict change in future utility. Loewenstein
et al. (2000) find that even if the consumer is able to predict the direction
in which her utility will change, she systematically miscalculates the impact
of the change. They explain that the real utility lies between her prediction
and her current situation.
Before continuing, we collect and summarize some of the issues that
have been tackled so far. Our goal is to understand product innovation
from the consumer’s perspective. We agree that decisions concerning old
habits and new consumptions intertwine in coherent consumer behaviour.
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We consider the models of habit formation especially relevant and shall
develop them further in the following sections, trying to look deeper into
reasons relating past and present consumptions. Future consumption affects
present decisions too, but the kind and level of uncertainty implied by the
papers quoted so far, is not the central concern of our work.
Our ideas are closer to Witt (2001), he recognized as one of the main
problems concerning the theory of technological change the fact that we
know too little about demand, in particular about the evolution of pref-
erences. In his article he asks about the satiation of needs, and how is it
possible that in developed societies income per capita has been continuously
growing but demand is never satiated. His main conclusion is that one
possible explanation could be that the patterns of consumer demand are be-
coming increasingly specialised. In this chapter, we are mostly concentrated
in how new goods enter the consumer’s decision.
We consider it an important issue that economic theory gives very little
explanation for the consumption of new goods; there is no formal explanation
that helps us understand such consumption. The only relevant attempt
was Lancaster (1966). He argued that goods are consumed because of their
characteristics and that new goods are recombinations of old characteristics;
the combination of characteristics that the new goods offer is closer to the
consumer’s preferences than those of the old goods, hence the new goods
are bought. The main problem of this approach, as is mentioned by Swann
(2002), is that the question of why we consume new goods is simply reworded
as why we consume new characteristics of goods. Following Lancaster’s
ideas, Stigler and Becker (1977) suggest comparing the consumer to a firm.
In this approach the consumer is treated as if he were producing utility in
a firm whose inputs are characteristics. Thereby they succeed in presenting
a more dynamic consumer. However, the question of why we consume new
characteristics is left without answer. More successful although less formal
is the explanation given by Scitosvky (1977); the consumer needs change
in what she consumes simply because she needs novelty to reach well-being
and comfort. Following his ideas, and merging them with the previous
ones, we find useful the work done by Bianchi (1998, 2002). She argues
that novelty is a relevant factor in the inputs that the consumer is using
to maximize utility. Both Scitosky and Bianchi acknowledge in their work
the research concerning novelty done by Berlyne (1974). He was working
on novelty and the reaction of humans towards novelty. One of the most
important conclusions from his research in behavioural psychology is the so-
called Wund Curve. It is an inverted U-shaped curve that plots hedonistic
reaction against novelty. Things too new or too old offer a low hedonistic
satisfaction, the peak being somewhere between the two extremes.
We believe it necessary to develop further a sound theory that integrates
some of the results produced by economists and psychologists working in
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fields close to behavioural psychology. Some of these results are so crucial
that we need to provide more detail, enabling the reader to get a clearer view
why individuals consume new products. Hence the next section, in which
we shall discuss in depth some of these results and link them to economic
theory, in particular to consumer theory.
3 A new theory for consumer behaviour
Decisions concerning consumption cover a broad spectrum of goods and ser-
vices: a car, a ticket for the cinema, a dinner in a restaurant, new shoes,
a Picasso picture. . . . The reasons behind these decisions may well be quite
different; the reason for going to the cinema is a probably very different from
that which pushes you to buy a new car.
The first thing we need to understand is that there are two different
activities that the consumer is continually repeating: buying and using.
Buying means using money to get something. Using means getting utility
out of direct contact with the object or service. One important issue in
our argument is at what moment the consumer maximizes her utility; when
buying or when using? In some cases these two actions are connected in time
and they follow one from another; for example, drinking a cup of coffee in the
cafeteria, where the actions of buying and using the good are linked in time.
In this case, there is also a unique relation between the two actions: you
buy one coffee and you can only use it once. In other cases, the two actions
are neither so simultaneous nor are they in unique one-to-one relationships.
Take a knife as an example; you buy it once and you may use it many times.
The two actions are separated in time and are not bilateral.
We believe that the concept of “consumer utility space” can help us to
understand consumer behaviour. We shall define this theoretical space as
one that contains the object or service so that the consumer can extract
some utility from it. It is not a physical space. Some examples may help to
explain how we use this concept. Tomatoes in your refrigerator are inside
the utility space, those in the supermarket are not. The films at the cinema
are outside the utility space, the specific film for which you bought a ticket
is inside it. Books in the library are outside, the book borrowed from the
library is inside. Whatever we can use and get some utility from will be
inside. Our consumer is able by direct contact to intellectually or physically
enjoy things within the space.
First we should anlayse how goods enter into this utility space. We
suggest two possible ways:
• market provision, which basically means the consumers buy a good,
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• non-market provision, for which we find various possibilities: home-
made produce, loans, heritage, gifts. . .
Then we can describe three main reasons why the good leaves the space:
• The good disappears, such as food when eaten or the cinema film when
it finishes. After using it once, it no longer exists
• The good breaks or gets too old to be used. An example would be an
old computer
• We get jaded from using the good. This might happen in different
ways, slowly (boredom) or quickly (dislike). Envisage the boredom of
an outmoded t-shirt or the foodstuff whose taste we dislike from the
very first trial.
These distinctions may appear redundant. However they are important
variables which may explain product innovation and economic growth. Take
a hypothetical case, that the average lifespan of electrical house appliances is
under the control of the manufacturer. Think about an electrical appliance
which most people already consume habitually, for example a refrigerator,
and then imagine a cartel which decides to reduce the average life of re-
frigerators. If such a decision were taken and implemented it would have a
positive impact on the growth of the country. However, this discussion is
outside our scope and will be left for future research.
But to return to the previous point - once we have the good inside
the consumer’s utility space we can study the formation and evolution of
preferences. This will be the main subject of subsection 3.1. However in
the subsequent subsections, 3.2 and 3.3, we are more restrictive and focus
on only one kind of good. Goods, and when we say goods we mean also
services, of one single use. We define a single-use good as one, provided by
the market, that the consumer buys (gets inside her consumer utility space)
and uses (gets utility) before it leaves the space. For a single-use good the
three parts of this process occur within each time period.
We discuss the evolution of a preference for a single good in the next
subsection. The use of a good is compared to the exposure of an individual
to a constant external stimulus. We argue that conclusions from behavioural
psychology are valid when considering consumer behaviour. Novelty and its
relevance for consumer choices will be the focus of the subsection that follows
and in subsection 3.3 the two previous points will be integrated into a single
process of decision as made by a consumer.
3.1 Evolution of preferences
We concentrate on the evolution of preferences for one good which is already
inside the utility space. We will make a categorical definition of a good and
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fix periods of time as follows: a short period in which the individual will
consume the good, followed by a long period of time with no consumption.
The break in consumption will be called the “time interval” between con-
sumptions. Once the good and the period are defined we can study how this
good affects the consumer, or in other words how preferences for this good
evolve. Firstly we analyse the evolution of reactions of an individual who is
repeatedly exposed to an external stimulus. Secondly we adjust the results
from psychological behaviour to consumer utility, arguing that consump-
tion of a good is an external stimulus. We then analyse some important
differences for consumer behaviour.
To understand the evolution of reactions that an individual has towards
a stimulus, we follow the research done by Solomon (1980). He was looking
at the way individuals react to exposure for a few seconds to an external
stimulus when followed by a long period without exposure. He focused on
the evolution of reactions to the repetition of the experiment. Working
with both positive and negative stimuli, Solomon measured reactions using
physiological indicators: excitement, blood pressure, heart activity 1. . . .
As an example of his animal experiments, he worked with young ducklings
and studied their reactions (agitated movements and high peak sounds)
to the presence of a moving mother duck (a positive stimuli). He studied
how reactions evolved when the cycle of exposure followed by a long period
without exposure was repeated. Other experiments involved dogs, monkeys,
and humans.
As a result of his experiments the “Opponent process” theory was for-
mulated.This theory states that if an individual is exposed over a period of
time to a stimulus repeated at constant intervals, the effect of the stimu-
lus will decrease over time. He argues that the impact of the stimulus on
hedonistic perception depends on three variables: the length of the time
intervals without exposure, the memory of the individual and the quality
of the stimulus. The stimulating effect depends on these three variables as
follows:
• Time interval between exposures: the longer the interval the greater
the effect of the stimulus in the next repetition.
• The memory of the individual: the greater the capacity of the individ-
ual to remember past experiences the lower the effect of the stimulus
in each repetition.
• The quality of the stimulus: an increase in the quality of the stimulus
will cause an increase in the experienced hedonistic perception.
The consumption of a good can be considered a concrete example of
the broad definition of an external stimulus. Thus the consumption of the
1More recent research explains these reactions based on the endorphins. See for ex-
ample Ito and Cacioppo (1999)
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good generates in the brain a positive reaction which is perceived by the
consumer as an increase in her hedonistic situation. To study the evolution
of preferences we need to examine the relation between exposure of the
individual to the same stimulus with the evolution in the perceived level of
pleasure. Assuming our consumer is only affected by the consumption of a
single good from within her consumer utility space, we shall consider how the
three ’opponent process’ variables alter this consumption. The utility that
the consumer derives from something inside her space (i.e. the increase in her
hedonistic level) will be called “experienced utility”. How does experienced
utility change as we modify the three variables, one variable at a time,
while, as above, the individual consumes a good for a short period of time
followed by a long break? Starting with the length of time interval between
consumptions: if the time interval is sufficiently long for her memory to
hardly evoke the last experience then the consumer will be able to enjoy
the next consumption almost as she did the first time. As the time interval
decreases the consumer will begin to develop an aversion to that specific
good. If the intermissions are very short she may even develop an aversion
strong enough to prevent the good’s use for the rest of her life. If the aversion
is not too strong, a long period of rest, a long break, might be enough to
allow her to enjoy the good again.
Concerning the second variable, if our period of study is the consumer’s
whole lifespan then memory may play an important role. The better the
consumer’s memory the faster the level of experienced utility will decrease.
For this case imagine two individuals, one adult (normal memory) and one
old person (lower memory). Both being exposed to the same good for iden-
tical periods, the adult’s level of experienced utility will decrease faster than
that of the old person. Proving, as Scitovsky points out, that habit for-
mation in elderly populations is stronger than that among younger adults.
Scitovsky refers to experiments done concerning the diet of one group of old
people versus another of adults. These two groups can be consuming the
same thing, or doing the same thing, but reach boredom at different times,
with adults becoming bored sooner than elderly people.
The third point is that an increase in the good’s quality, ceteris paribus,
will induce an increase of experienced utility.
At this stage, it is worth recalling classical consumer theory, and reflect-
ing that the theory is only based on an increase in the quantity consumed.
It states that greater quantity always causes a positive effect on the experi-
enced utility but each extra unit consumed will have less effect (decreasing
marginal utility). The classical theory presents an analysis of one single
variable affecting the level of experienced utility: increases in quantity. But
the analysis of the repetition of consumption of identical quantities at un-
changing prices has always been ignored.
There is one important difference between a consumer theory and a be-
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havioural psychology one. In the second case we are studying reactions to
an external situation which is not determined by the individual. A con-
sumer, however, has freedom to choose her own exposure to the good, thus
setting up her own experimental environment. So we can postulate that the
consumer subconsciously learns how to consume the good in the sense that,
given a quality of the good and a stable memory, she learns to set the right
time interval between consumptions in order to experience utility. In section
4, the model will assume fixed time intervals, constant memory and equal
quality of a good while we give the consumer freedom to choose the good’s
quantity according to her experienced utility.
Concluding, three main factors explain the evolution of preference for
a good: the time between each consumption, the memory of the consumer
and the good’s quality. Separate consumers may be exposed to the same
consumption of a single good and may have very different levels of experi-
enced utility; however the evolution itself of their preferences towards that
good will follow similar patterns.
The next section concerns novelty, an important idea that explains how
a good enters the consumer utility space.
3.2 The search for novelty
The focus of the previous section was the evolution of preferences and expe-
rienced utility, in particular the evolution of utility when neither quantity
nor prices change. We were thinking about a situation in which the con-
sumer has direct contact with goods and is learning from past experiences.
While considering habit formation we were following the studies begun by
Duesenberry, as noted in our review of the literature. We also know from
the literature that several writers on economics try to explain present con-
sumption as being influenced by future discounted utility (among many oth-
ers: Jevons, Ainslie (1975), Thaler (1981), Tversky and Kahneman (1986),
Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) and Ramsey (1928)). From their work we
understand that consumers are able to improve their hedonistic situation
by imagining that they are using goods and therefore deriving utility from
future consumption. However here we shall be more precise in our interpre-
tation. We are not looking at the impact that future consumption of old
goods will have on the present consumer. Our main viewpoint is the present
impact on utility that unused goods have on present decisions and that the
idea of buying new goods raises the present level of utility. In the current
section we argue that consumers search for a different form of utility, one de-
rived from novelty. However our purpose is not to define novelty but rather
to see how crucial it is to understanding consumer behaviour. Therefore we
concentrate on a description of what we mean rather than on its definition.
To introduce this idea we quote Adam Smith:
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“ The imagination and memory [. . . ] fluctuated to no purpose from
thought to thought, and we remain still uncertain and undetermined
where to place it, or what to think of it. It is this fluctuation and vain
recollection, together with the emotion [. . . ] that they excite, which
constitute the sentiment properly called Wonder, and which occasion
that staring and sometimes that rolling of the eyes, that suspension of
the breath, and that swelling of the heart, which we may all observe,
both in ourselves and others, when wondering at some new object,
and which are the natural symptoms of uncertain and undetermined
thought”.2
Although Adam Smith was describing the reaction of the scientist when
he finds something new, it is easy for the reader to imagine the same sen-
sation of wonder applied to a consumer. And we, as consumers, have all
observed these reactions both in ourselves and in others. The idea of pos-
sessing a new car, a new house, a digital camera, a new pair of shoes or even
a new jacket. . . The list of objects is long that may produce similar feelings
of wonder. Consumers may be excited by different objects or ideas but it
would be difficult to find a consumer that has not ever experienced such sen-
sations. Bianchi’s research (1998) presents these thoughts well. She argues
that novelty is an important input determining the utility of a consumer.
This sensation of novelty is occasionally very strong and at others quite
mild. We are happy to pay for a portion of this novelty, as in the case of
a “news”paper where the utility does not come so much from reading the
paper itself as from the feeling of getting some novelty. If we reconsider
the previous discussion about the definition of goods, we could define the
good as the “newspaper”, the consumer developing the habit of buying a
newspaper every day. However if we define the good as “the new” then every
day it is a different good. This point is important because it means that
the consumer gets utility from what she does not know and is also willing
to pay for it.
We now present two relevant results concerning novelty; as in the previ-
ous subsection they are part of psychological research. Presenting Berlyne’s
work, we will discuss how people react toward different degrees of novelty,
but beforehand we will also mention results by Hebb (1955). Hebb’s ex-
planations of brain cell activity are very relevant for our own discussion.
His main conclusion is that humans need a certain amount of novelty in
their environmental stimuli to feel well. As an example, Hebb set up an
experiment in which individuals were asked to fill in a questionnaire of basic
questions about culture as well as performing basic mathematical exercises.
Afterwards they were asked to spend several hours in an empty white room
2Essays on Philosophical Issues: History of Astronomy p. 39
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before filling in an equivalent questionnaire. The majority of the individuals
scored very poorly in the second test. He explains that to be able to perform
intellectual activities the brain needs a certain amount of external stimulus.
He was studying the relation between the activity of brain cells, neurons, and
the feeling of well-being in humans. Arising from his studies he proposed
a theory based on “arousal” due to environmental stimuli. He concluded
that a person needs changing stimuli in order to feel well. His conclusion is
interesting for us, because some changes in stimulus may come from goods
that the consumer has in her consumer utility space, while others may be
created by the market. The second case provides a reason why a consumer
buys new things. So far economists have been interested in studying a single
set of goods and the effect that these goods have on the consumer’s utility.
Our argument is that the curiosity, and therefore the utility, of the consumer
is raised by the idea of buying a novel good.
If consumers need novelty we should determine the degrees of novelty,
and understand how changes in the degree of novelty affect consumers’ util-
ity. The research presented by Berlyne (1974) brings some light to the issue
of novelty and the level required by individuals. He studied the reaction of
humans when exposed to novel objects. One example, among many experi-
ments that he made, was to show drawings, for example of a tree, changing
the degree of novelty in each drawing from a very basic tree shape to a
futuristic image, passing by very detailed drawings. People were asked to
choose which one they preferred; the majority chose one between the two
extremes. Based on his experiments he concluded that positive perception
of the novelty by the individual follows an inverted U-shaped curve, the so-
called “Wund-curve”. The individual will dislike exposure to things either
extremely original or too little so. He also reaches a similar conclusion to
the one presented by Solomon: if a person is exposed for a long time to
an extreme novelty, the initial dislike may with repetition turn to pleasure.
Think for example how new fashions arise; at first very few people use the
article but with time its consumption becomes massive.
Psychology, then, gives us two main ideas concerning novelty: we need a
certain amount of it to feel good and the level of it that we choose is never
extreme.
Still, as economists, novelty is important because it can explain why a
consumer buys new goods. The utility she gets from a new item comes not
from her personal experience but from imagining how well she could feel in
the future. Lancaster (1966) argued that new goods are bought because they
fit the intrinsic characteristics better. However, many economists, such as
Swann (2002), recognise this replaces the question of why we consume new
goods by why we consume new characteristics. We believe it is a matter of
the good’s definition. Taking a mobile phone as an example, we could think
of it as a telephone with a new characteristic. Lancaster’s argument is that
the new good offers us the possibility to talk almost everywhere. Combining
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the two characteristics allows one to talk to distant people while being free
to move about. This optimal new combination makes one buy the good.
Our line of argument is different. When confronted with a telephone char-
acteristic such as “the capacity to talk without having a fixed connection”
Lancaster’s theory cannot offer us an explanation because the characteristic
is entirely new, not intrinsic. The question then becomes why we think we
shall get some utility out of something we can never have experienced before.
Our explanation is that the consumer buys the new good/characteristic be-
cause of the excitement produced in her imagination by the idea of using it.
We believe that one buys new things because of their novelty value. This
novelty produces in us so much pleasure that we pay for it.
In the next subsection we shall study how novelty and habit formation
form a whole, how these two concepts are interrelated to maximise utility.
3.3 Deciding what to buy
We have talked about the consumer’s two principal activities: buying and
using. Classical theory, in summary, states that the two are joined in time
and that the consumer maximizes her utility between a fixed set of goods
to result in an optimal combination of quantities according to prices and
preferences. We propose the consumer’s choices are explained by a mixture
of novelty and past experiences or habits and that what our consumer will
be maximizing is a mixture of past and future expectation; we shall call it
“decision utility”. This decision utility is not derived from direct contact
with the goods but from an blending of what she learned from the past and
what she is expecting in the future. Decision utility will determine what the
consumer buys. Her purchase will enable her to use the goods and reach a
level of perceived utility.
In a case where the consumer is subject to a budget constraint, let us
analyse two situations: as election between habits, and as a situation where
a new good appears and interferes with the old habits. In a case where
the selection is based only on old goods, the consumer has information on
each of them. She knows how much experienced utility each good gives
her. In the hypothetical case in which all prices are equal, those goods with
higher experienced utility will be bought in higher quantities. Experienced
utility will affect decision utility. With differing prices, defining the marginal
decision utility as the increase in the decision utility generated by the last
unit of good, the selection of goods will be done in such a way that the ratio
between the marginal decision utility and prices are equal for all selected
goods.
In the second case, in which a new good appears, the novelty associated
with the good will be compared to the experienced utility of old goods.
The budget will be redistributed accordingly to reach an equilibrium at the
point:
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1(EU1, 0)
P1
= .... =
DU
′
n(EUn, 0)
Pn
=
DU
′
n+1(0, Nn+1)
Pn+1
(1)
The formula attempts to explain that the consumer increases her hedo-
nistic level not only from things that she knows about (experienced utility)
but also from novelty. Both enter the decision of how much of each good to
buy. In the formula experienced utility is given by commodities numbered 1
to n, while novelty in this formula is given by commodity n+ 1. Our argu-
ment in this section is that the consumer forms her “decision utility” based
on a mixture of “experienced utility” and “novelty”. She chooses quantities
so that her optimal decision makes all these ratios equal.The terms experi-
enced utility and decision utility are borrowed from Kahneman et al. (1997)
3.
Novelty
Utility Space
Figure 1: Formation of decision utility
Figure 1 attempts to clarify the whole process of deciding what to buy.
Although we know there are other ways of getting goods into the utility
space, I focus attention on market provision and, for simplicity, on goods
with a single use. With a mixture of novelty and experienced utility the
consumer will form her decision utility. Depending on prices and budget
constraints she will get some quantity of each good, experience utility out
of them and once again start the whole process.
3Kahneman is talking about instant utility and remembered utility. If the instant
utility comes out of direct contact with the good, the remembered utility will be the ret-
rospective reports that the brain of the individual is projecting. Here we will be considering
only one past period which is affecting our present decision utility, so I use experienced
utility as that based on some physical experienced contact with the good
16
It is worth highlighting one idea related to the new product. The first
time the consumer buys the new good her hedonistic level is increased even
though the rise does not come from direct contact with the good. As is the
case for the old and known goods, the increase in this hedonic perception
is a blending in the consumer’s imagination. We have called this increase
novelty.
We shall now classify goods according to how the consumer’s decisions
evolve. To do this we fix a long period and study the series of sequential
decisions for a single good taken by the consumer during this time. The
analysis shows four possible categories:
• Addictions: An addiction is the consumption of a good which in the
long run will require all the consumer’s income. Examples of such
addictions are drugs, compulsive gambling... Socially accepted lesser
addictions like drinking tea or coffee, smoking, and so forth are con-
sidered as habits.
• Eternal Habits: In this category we find goods which the consumer has
learnt to consume and of which some quantity will always be chosen
during the period studied even if new goods become available.
• Temporary Habits: The consumption of such a good will give the con-
sumer utility for some time but it will be excluded from her preferences
upon arrival of a new good. She will consume the good for a time but
before our period finishes will banish it from her shopping basket.
• Novelty consumptions: The consumer buys such goods out of curiosity
and will enjoy them until the novelty disappears. Once the novelty has
worn off the consumer no longer uses the good.
We should like to reflect here on how new products are analysed in an
environment of technical change. New products are in general better than
earlier ones and the greater the number of new products the better it will be
for the economy. The lack of a demand perspective hampers the distinction
between innovations. We are not talking about a demand pull versus an
innovative supply push. We are, however, interested in introducing into the
discussion the real utility generated by an innovation and how effective this
utility is in generating a habit in the consumer. We hope the reader sees
clearly that a new product which becomes an eternal habit is not the same
as a new product which becomes simply a temporal habit. The distinction
can only be studied when demand plays a role. The value of an innovation,
and its contribution to the wealth of the economy, depends on its capacity
to be needed by the consumer. In other words, by the capacity of the good
to develop a habit in the consumer. Habit in the long term is a major
determinant. However a certain degree of novelty is crucial, otherwise the
whole innovation could be wasted.
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What is especially relevant for us is that consumer behaviour is explained
by decision utility - the utility that she maximizes before making a purchase.
This decision utility is a blend of novelty and experienced utility. Novelty
is important in the first purchase; it helps us to understand the initial con-
sumption of a new good. By studying the evolution of preferences over a
fixed period we can classify them according to the trajectory they follow.
This is further explained in the next section.
4 Formalization of the model
In this section we present a mathematical model rooted in classical consumer
theory. The objective is to make the consumer more dynamic by introducing
habit formation and novelty into the formation of preferences. Improving the
dynamic behavior of our theoretical consumer gives us a routine in which
new products are part of the maximising decision of the consumer, thus
creating a theory that can be used to analyse technical change when we
focus only on product innovation.
Although it is impossible to introduce all the complexity of the consumer
into one formal model, the principal components discussed in the previous
sections will be considered. As in any formal model, we deal with a styl-
ization of the real consumer behaviour. Only goods of a single use will be
considered. The model consumer, though affected by past consumptions,
will maximise her utility in each period without considering the fact that
her current consumption may affect her future decisions. She maximises over
quantities, not over her habit formation. There are two principal reasons for
doing this: one conceptual and the other technical. First we consider that
such consumer behaviour is closer to reality, that any consumer maximising
her situation uses past experiences when making decisions but does not con-
sider the effects of present decisions on her future habits. In this way, pref-
erences evolve subconsciously, not under consumer control. The technical
reason is that the model has an analytical solution; omitting this assumption
will force us to use simulation techniques. For the sake of simplicity in this
article we will avoid the use of simulations. Therefore we model a myopic
consumer in the sense that her past experiences affect present decisions, but
the latter do not control the effect on her future choices.
The static maximization of the consumer will be the first part of the
section. Afterward we will analyse the utility function that is used and
its properties. The next step will be, linking the four categories of habit
formations into the model, to study the dynamic subconscious process of
the individual and to derive important conclusions for new products and
habit formation. We finalise the section by suggesting possible extensions
of the model.
The consumer chooses over a vector of goods −→x = (x1, x2, ..., xn). Prices
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are given, so she will choose the quantities that maximize her decision utility
function, defined as:
U(−→x ) =(
n∑
i=1
(xi − zi)
α)1/α (2)
with 0 < α < 1 and (xi − zi) > 0
The term xi represents the quantity of the good, and zi is the subsistence
level of the good i. This level is formed by past experience and/or novelty.
The terms xi and zi are always positive, xi because it is a quantity and
zi because we only study goods, assuming any positive quantity of good
will produce non-negative experienced utility. In a way, our function is the
familiar CES modified by the zi term. Or we could describe the function as
a Stone-Geary function nested in a CES.4 We now explain the solution of
the static problem.
4.1 Utility maximization in one period
Formally the consumer faces the following maximization problem:
max (
n∑
i=1
(xi − zi)
α)1/α (3)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xipi = E (4)
The static solution for this problem is:
x∗it = zit −
pξi
Σpξ+1j
(Σpjzjt − E) (5)
with ξ = 1α−1
The solution can be rewritten in the following way:
x∗it = zit + ψ
(E − Σpjzjt)
pi
(6)
4Another more classical form when dealing with similar problems in economics could
be a CES with depreciating coefficients. This approach would explain the continuous
decrease in utility given by the same good over time, but it would not permit the inclusion
of information about novelty or past experience. This function offers us the flexibility
necessary to further work on demand and technology.
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In this way it can be understood, with ψ being a price index, that the
level of consumption will be equal to the minimum “subsistence” consump-
tion zit plus a fraction ψ of the maximum amount of zit that could be bought
using the free disposable budget.
In the usual consumer problem, the marginal utility of each good tends
toward infinity as the quantity consumed decreases toward zero. In such
a setting all existing goods will be consumed even in infinitesimally small
quantities. But we are interested in studying how new goods enter consumer
preferences. To understand the introduction of a new good we shall specify
that, on the first occasion, the consumer buys at least one full unit of it.
If the maximization process give us a solution which is less than one, we
shall assume that the consumer does not sufficiently appreciate the good so
does not buy it. Such decisions lead to some goods not being consumed.
To implement this consumer behaviour we follow an algorithm: if any of
the resulting quantities fall below one, we shall eliminate that good and
then repeat the process to maximize utility. Should the quantity chosen of
two or more goods simultaneously be less than one, we eliminate first the
good whose quantity is the smallest and repeat the process. If in doing so
the other good now reaches a value greater than one, it will be retained,
otherwise it, too, is omitted and we continue. We reason that the consumer
weighs up all her possible options and if she cannot buy at least one first
full unit she will buy none of this good at all and redistribute her income
among other products.
By amending the classical theory, we derive that the following rule will
be satisfied at equilibrium,
(x1 − z1)
α−1
p1
=
(x2 − z2)
α−1
p2
= .... =
(xn − zn)
α−1
pn
In words, for each good the consumer is comparing marginal decision
utilities divided by prices, such that in equilibrium the ratios are equal.
The zi terms act like a minimum desired level, holding information of how
much pleasure she has previously received from consumption of each good.
The maximum decision utility is achieved at the point where the last unit
of income expended on each good, is such that distance from each good
corrected by past experiences given by the good and divided by prices is
equal.
4.1.1 Properties of the function
The first derivative of the decision utility with respect to the quantities is
positive, and the second negative. As in the classical model, we have a
marginal decision utility function which is positive but decreasing. Since zi
is awkward and rarely used in the literature, it is worth analysing its relation
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to decision utility and to marginal decision utility. The effect of an increase
in zi in the decision utility function will be:
∂U
∂zi
= −(xi − zi)
(α−1)U (1−α) (7)
The sign of this derivative is negative, since by assumption (xi−zi) > 0.
The idea behind the negative sign is that the higher our desire for a good,
the worse off we shall be. If we increase this habit formation term, other
things remaining equal, the current utility decreases.
The next equation presents the effect of this term in the marginal decision
utility for that specific good:
∂2U
∂xi∂zi
= (1− α)(xi − zi)
(α−1)(xj − zj)U
(1−2α) (8)
This term is always positive because the more accustomed you are to a
good, the more value you give to each extra unit of it compared to other
goods.
4.1.2 Elasticity of substitution
To conclude the analysis of this function, we calculate the elasticity of sub-
stitution between two goods:
d ln (x1/x2)
d ln (Ux1/Ux2)
=
1
α− 1
1
x1
− 1x2
( 1x1−z1 −
1
x2−z2
)
(9)
This proves that unless the two values of zi are equal to zero this function
no longer presents constant elasticity of substitution. In other words, we will
be working with non-homothetic preferences and that an increase in income
will not be distributed proportionately among all goods.
4.2 Evolution of the dynamic subconscious process
Having studied the static maximization, we now analyse the dynamics of the
evolution of subconscious preferences. The term zi, as before, contains infor-
mation on experienced utility and novelty. These concepts play a significant
role in both short-term and long-term equilibrium. We explain experienced
utility, then novelty and the way these two terms affect zi. A set of dynamic
equations will be set up to describe quantities bought over time depending
on the evolution of preferences.
Working with non-homothetic preferences implies that increases in in-
come will not be equally distributed among all goods. This point is a cor-
nerstone of our research. Basically we are always working with goods which
differ from each other in their capacity to produce experienced utility. If
the same quantity of two goods is consumed, the experienced utility will
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be different for each one, each unit of consumption of each good producing
differing amounts of experienced utility. To derive the level of experienced
utility produced by the total quantity consumed of one specific good, we
multiply this total quantity by a goods-specific coefficient, whose range is
from 0 to 1. This coefficient is an inner characteristic of the good and does
not change over time. The consumer chooses the quantity but the charac-
teristic is exogenous to the model. In our model experienced utility has the
following analytical form:
EUit = cixit−1 (10)
with 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1.
The term ci is the intrinsic capacity that the good has to produce ex-
perienced utility. This term is goods-specific, and it is constant over time.
The actual level of experienced utility of the good i depends on ci and on
the past period quantity xit−1.
Novelty will be modelled so that it decreases with time :
Nit = Niσ
t (11)
with σ < 1. This parameter controls the depreciation of novelty over
time t, which is initially zero. The whole term measures how much the idea
of consuming the good excites the consumer, and how this feeling loses its
power over time. Later in the discussion we present an initial situation in
which the consumer has already consumed something. Even though in the
past these ’old goods’ may have had some novelty, in the present the novelty
is assumed to be zero.
In a general case the good has both novelty and experienced utility:
zit = cixit−1 +Niσ
(t−1) (12)
For simplicity we will concentrate here on only two goods: x1, the old
one (with no novelty) and x2, a new one (with no experienced utility for the
first maximization period).
Introducing the definition of the zi term presented by the previous equa-
tion in the static solution 5 will provides a system of differential equations.
By studying the dynamics, the next subsection will extend the possible out-
comes for any new good that appears in the consumer’s life.
The dynamics of preference evolution are presented, concentrating on the
simplest case. Considering only one old good (x1) and one new one (x2),
their respective parameters zi at each moment of time are z1t = c1x1t−1 ,
z2t = c2x2t−1 +Nσ
t−1. Substituting these values in the solution 5 gives us
the following system of simultaneous differential equations:
22
[
x1t
x2t
]
=


c1
(
1−
pξ+11
θ
)
−c2
p2p
ξ
1
θ
−c1
p1p
ξ
2
θ c2
(
1−
pξ+12
θ
)


[
x1t−1
x2t−1
]
+

 Epξ1−Np2pξ1σt−1θ
Epξ2−Np1p
ξ
2σ
t−1
θ


with θ = p1ξ+1 + p2ξ+1. The system presents an analytical solution
which for each good is equal to:
x1t = Aλ
t +BNσt−1 +
p1ξ
(c1−1)∑ piξ+1
(ci−1)
E (13)
x2t = A
′λt +B′Nσt−1 +
p2ξ
(c2−1)∑ piξ+1
(ci−1)
E (14)
with λ = c1p2
ξ+1+c2p1ξ+1
p2ξ+1+p1ξ+1
< 1
The terms A, B, A’ and B’ are constants. Their values depend on the
initial value we want to analyse. For a hypothetical case in which in the first
period all income is used on the first good, and nothing on the new good,
the values of these constants are as follows:
A = Ep1λ −
pξ1(c2−1)
λϑ
B = 1N
[
p1(λ−1)(c2−1)
ϑ +
E(c1−1)
p1
−
pξ1(E(c1−1)+Np2)
pξ+11 +p
ξ+1
2
]
A′ =
−pξ2(c1−1)
λϑ
B′ = 1 +
pξ2(c1−1)(λ−1)
Nϑ −
pξ2(E(c1−1)+Np2)
N(pξ+11 +p
ξ+1
2 )
ϑ = pξ+11 (c2 − 1) + p
ξ+1
2 (c1 − 1)
4.3 One new good, four possible outcomes
In this section we study how a new good enters into the utility space of
the consumer and, if it does, how and why it remains there. As we said
before, the maximization is done in repetitive steps with the condition that
the solution for any good is greater than unity. Any good whose chosen
quantity is less than one will be eliminated and the income redistributed
among the other goods.
The entrance of a new good deserves special attention so an example
with the easiest case will be analysed step by step. Initially the consumer
only has one good and we wish to know whether or not she buys a new
product. We also want to know if she will continue to buy this product
in the future. The initial conditions for each good, and the value for their
respective z terms, are the following:
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• The consumer expends all her income on the old good so she consumes
E/p1 units of it. The experienced utility will be c1E/p1. Because this
good is an old one the novelty is zero. Therefore the habit formation
is equal to z11 = c1E/p1.
• For the second good, since it is a new good its experienced utility will
be zero and the only parameter will be the novelty. z21 = N .
Taking equation 5 and defining it for each good we have:
x11 = z11 −
pξ1
θ (p1z11 + p2z21 − E)
x21 = z21 −
pξ2
θ (p1z11 + p2z21 − E)
(15)
with θ = pξ+11 + p
ξ+1
2
If we substitute the habit formation part for each good we have the first
solution for the next period; for t = 1, we will have
x∗11 =
Ec1
p1
−
pξ1
θ (p1Ec1 + p2N − E)
x∗21 = N −
pξ2
θ (p1Ec1 + p2N − E)
(16)
If x∗21 < 1 then the consumer will buy no first unit of the new good and
she will still expend all her income on the old good. Given the rest of pa-
rameters, it is the level of initial novelty that determines the consumption of
the first unit of good. The minimal level of novelty needed for the consumer
to get a first full unit is:
N∗ ≥ 1 +
pξ2
θ
(E(c1 − 1) + p2) (17)
Any value of novelty below this means the consumer is perhaps inter-
ested in the good but not enough to buy the first whole unit. As initial
consumption does not depend on experienced utility, novelty is the only
variable that controls it, other things being equal.
The next important question is, if the consumer buys a first unit, whether
she will continue to buy it. In other words, whether or not she redistributes
her income between two goods. By studying the solution presented by equa-
tions 13 and 14 we can answer this question. With λ = c1p2
ξ+1+c2p1ξ+1
p2ξ+1+p1ξ+1
< 1
and σ < 1, when t goes to infinity the system has the following long-term
solution :
x¯∗1 =
p1ξ
(c1−1)∑ piξ+1
(ci−1)
E (18)
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x¯∗2 =
p2ξ
(c2−1)∑ piξ+1
(ci−1)
E (19)
The long-term solution does not depend on novelty, but on the capacity
the good has to provide experienced utility. It depends on the parameter c2.
If we are interested in knowing whether the second good will become a new
habit then we should find the conditions for which the solution is x¯∗2 ≥ 1.
A relevant result of this study is that although a good may have a long-
term solution (in our example x¯∗2) greater than unity it might not have
enough novelty value to be tried a first time. According to the values of
novelty and experienced utility three interesting cases are possible:
• N ≥ N∗ and x¯∗2 ≥ 1. This is the case of a successful innovation which
will give utility to the consumer in the long run.
• N ≤ N∗ and x¯∗2 ≥ 1. In this case, the innovation was potentially
successful but the consumer never took an interest in it, possibly due
to a failure in the marketing of the innovation.
• N ≥ N∗ and x¯∗2 ≤ 1. This is a tested innovation that is found to give
so little experienced utility that in the long run the consumer will go
back to her old consumptions.
To conclude this section and to link its ideas, we reflect that up to now
we have concentrated on the perspective of the consumer. So far, when we
referred to novelty we assumed it to be an inner curiosity of the consumer.
However, looking at things from the firm’s viewpoint might bring different
insights into the discussion. Should a firm wish to introduce a new good in
a market, it is vital to raise the perceived level of novelty of its product. In
solution 17 we can see good reason for a firm to do marketing and publicity; it
is one of the best ways to raise perceived novelty. Otherwise, even if the good
is technologically superior or useful to the consumer, it may never be sold.
We consider it crucial that studies of technological change should include
the marketing perspective and we return to the subject in the conclusion of
this chapter.
4.4 Graphical analysis of the model
Figure 2, presenting four graphs, attempts to illustrate the concepts being
discussed. The first three panels plot the quantity of each good over time in
three different situations. In the first case we plot a successful innovation,
case 2 is for a good which will not be chosen on a long-term basis and case
3 is that of an addiction. In panel 4 of the figure we plot, using indifference
curves, the different situations in time at which the consumer might be.
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In our graphs consumer income is equal to 1000; there are two goods, one
old (x1) and one new (x2). The old good’s price is p1 = 10, the price for the
new one is p2 = 5. Varying the values of cis, the proportion of experience
utility achieved by the consumer for each unit of good, and novelty; changes
both the dynamics and the steady state.
The first panel of figure 2 is the case of a successful innovation. Initially
the consumer buys a lot of this good, generating a peak in consumption at C.
As the novelty value drops towards zero the consumer still finds this good
useful but at a lower level of consumption, point B, where the long-term
stable consumption level is reached.
Panel 2 is an example of a temporary consumption. The novelty for this
product is high and therefore the person consumes it for a period, but as
time passes she goes back to the original situation.
The next case is an addiction, in which the new good gives so much
experienced utility that the consumer decides to use all her income on the
new good. This is presented in the third panel.
The last item of the figure, the fourth panel, is an attempt to reconcile
this theory with the classical consumer theories. This presents indifference
curves that show the marginal decision utility that each combination of
goods has at each moment of time. The curves represent different combina-
tions of quantities from both goods, for which the consumer will be equally
happy when making the decision. In our case the curves change over time
as does the quantity chosen for each good. The lines A, B, C, D in the
three previous panels represent situations in which the indifference curves
are A, B, C or D. Still, as in the classical case, the solution for each moment
of time is given by the point where the indifference curves are tangential
to the budget constraint. In our case the curves move over time, though
always tangential to the budget line, until the consumer reaches a long-term
solution.
To clarify panel 4 let us compare it to the different situations described
by panel 1. At the beginning only the old good is bought, which in panel 1
is marked by line A. In the fourth panel this is represented by indifference
curve A, in which only the old good is consumed. The next line rightwards
in panel 1 is line C, a situation that in the indifference map is represented
by C. Line B and indifference curve B are similar. Panel 1 represents total
quantities and changes in time. The dynamics in the indifference curves are
expressed by movements of this curve over time as habits form. In the case of
the panel 1, the evolution of the indifference curves over time is represented
in panel 4, starting in indifference curve A, moving towards C and reaching
equilibrium in B.
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Figure 2: Time and preferences evolution
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4.5 Extending the model
Although we concentrate mainly on inconspicuous consumption, in this sec-
tion we allow the consumer to be partially influenced by societal choices,
presenting a discussion based on long-term solutions. We assume here that
consumers are not all equal and that our consumer is different from the rest
of the society. We will be treating the society as one single big consumer.
Acknowledging the importance of an initial level of novelty, and assuming
that this level is reached, we look at the relationship between the solution
for the society and that of the individual. Formally we remodel zi to be:
zit = φ(cixit−1) + (1− φ)(ηiXit−1) (20)
The ci parameter captures the inner capacity of the good to produce
experienced utility in the consumer. xit−1 is the amount of good previ-
ously consumed. The value of the φ parameter controls the extent to which
the consumer is influenced by society. A value of φ = 0 represents an
outward-looking consumer, whose preferences are completely determined by
society - a case of pure conspicuous consumption. At the other extreme,
a value of φ = 1 brings us back to the consumer presented in earlier sec-
tions, whose preferences are determined only by her experienced utility - an
inward-looking consumer. The whole society is treated as a one big single
consumer whose decisions are not controlled by our consumer. The ηi pa-
rameter, in a way parallel to ci, accounts for the level of experienced utility
felt by society as a whole for the consumption of each unit of goods. In
principle, it is only interesting to study the case in which ηi is different from
ci, and is less than 1
5. A capital X is used to denote the quantity consumed
by society, Xit−1 is the past consumption of the society for good i. We as-
sume that the individual consumer does not have the power to change social
decisions although these decisions affect her.
When φ 6= 1, the question that we have studied before, the buying of
the first unit of good and the habit formation of the consumer is affected
by societal decision. Using the habit formation of equation 20, we work as
in the previous sections by constructing the system of dynamic equations in
x1,x2,X1,X2 (The system of equations is presented in appendix A)
When it comes to novelty, we assume that the level is high enough to
allow our individual consumer to buy one first unit. We could also present
a discussion on how novelty in this partially conspicuous model is affected.
However, we shall leave that for future research as there are many assump-
tions which could be considered (for example: whether the good is new only
for the consumer, new for all of the society; each possible combination will
give a different solution). What becomes more interesting, and easier to
5If it is equal to one, the society will be in a situation of being in a total addiction,
which does not make much economics sense, though it is possible to study mathematically.
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track, is the effect of society on long-term solutions. For the whole society
the long run solution will be:
X¯∗2 =
p2ξ
(η2−1)∑ piξ+1
(ηi−1)
ESoc (21)
The long-term solution for the consumer in this new case will be:
p
ξ
2
(c2−1)
φ
∑ pξ+1
i
(ci−1)
E + (1− φ)
p
ξ
2
(c2−1)
φ
∑ pξ+1
i
(ci−1)
ESoc
or, simplifying,
p
ξ
2
(c2−1)
φ
∑ pξ+1
i
(ci−1)
(E + (1− φ)ESoc)
One immediately notes that the long-term solution for the single con-
sumer is not affected by the ηi parameter. It is only the long-term amount
of the good bought by society (X¯∗2 see equation 21) that really affects the
decision of the individual consumer. The importance of this finding is that it
opens up a way to connect the result of our consumer with the conspicuous
consumption literature. It would be interesting to analyse the effect of an
outward-looking consumer at the macro level, but this is outside the scope
of our research.
5 Conclusions
The main motivation of the thesis is to analyse and study the effects of prod-
uct innovation on the economy. By product innovation we mean neither im-
provements in quality nor the effect that new products have on production.
We attempt to calculate the direct effect that an innovative product has on
final demand. A major constraint was that classical utility maximization
does not consider this factor; explanations such as that of Lancaster offer
little flexibility when studying product innovation.
In the article we have attempted to incorporate ideas from behavioural
psychology so that the consumption theory and its conclusions correspond
more closely to real human behaviour. Therefore, together with this chap-
ter’s study of novelty, we use results from behavioural economics to build a
theoretical framework flexible enough to explain habit formation and con-
sumption of new goods and so to construct a more responsive consumer. By
incorporating the two concepts with the idea that the consumer is maximiz-
ing decision utility we can understand why we consume new things and how
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we form our preferences. When the maximization process is studied over
time, continually repeated as by a real consumer, it clarifies the evolution of
preferences. The article describes four possible outcomes: addiction, eternal
habit, temporary habit and consumption of novelty.
Of special importance for technical change is that the value of innovation
should be linked to the utility given to the consumer over a long period of
time. Until now the value of an innovation has been approximated by the
number of citations assigned to a patent or by analysing the percentage
of sales due to innovative items at the company level. However, to our
knowledge, no one has tried to calculate the value of an innovation based
on the utility given to a consumer. Our concept allows one to relate closely
the value of an innovation to the level of experienced utility.
Independently of an innovation’s potential to generate new habits, the
new good must present a minimum threshold of novelty. An innovation
that remains unknown to consumers but has the potential to generate ex-
perienced utility may become a failure. Even very good innovations may
require marketing effort to increase their novelty value so that they can in
turn increase the well-being of society.
From the ideas put forward in this chapter, especially from the psycho-
logical introduction concerning the reasons why we form habits and seek
novelty, we understand that humans are always searching for difference and
novelty. It is in this eternal search that technology and inventions have a
chance to become real innovations. The value of these inventions has to
be related to changes in the standard of living. Also from this chapter we
understand that there is a need for coordination between innovation and
marketing strategies. For example, from a policy perspective, if the gov-
ernment targets funding to a group of firms the funding should also include
some help towards marketing the new products. Otherwise very good inven-
tions may fail simply because insufficient people hear of them thus wasting
the costly innovation effort.
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A Dynamic conspicuous consumption:System of equations for the dynamic problem
with conspicuous consumption
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